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Thinking About Polygamy

SANFORD LEVINSON*

“In United States history,” Professor Calhoun begins her paper, “there
have been four important bars to civil marriage.”1 These four, she says,
involve marriages between slaves, marriages across racial lines,
polygamous marriages, and same-sex marriages. She is, of course,
absolutely correct that these are “four important bars to civil marriage”
that have operated within our history as a nation (or, previously, as
colonies of Great Britain). Yet the sentence is subtly misleading if it is
taken to mean that these constitute an exhaustive list of “important bars.”
Consider, for example, the prohibitions of incestuous marriages and the
use of minimum-age requirements to prevent “underage” marriage
(which thereby becomes the equivalent of statutory rape).
Perhaps they are excluded from the list because of an assumption that
few people actually wish to engage in incestuous or “underage”
marriage. This is obviously an empirical, rather than conceptual,
question, and the actual evidence, assuming we could easily ascertain it,
might be more complicated than one would assume. As to incest, a 2002
report published in The Journal of Genetic Counseling noted that “[i]n
some parts of the world . . . 20 to 60 percent of all marriages are between
* W. St. John Garwood and W. St. John Garwood Jr. Centennial Chair in Law,
University of Texas Law School. I am very grateful to Larry Alexander and Steven
Smith for both inviting me to the very interesting conference on marriage at the
University of San Diego School of Law and being extremely gracious hosts. I am also
grateful to the other participants for their consistently interesting and provocative
arguments, even (or especially) when I disagreed with them. The general topic, as one
can easily predict, is extremely controversial, and all too much public discussion settles
for polemic and posturing. None of this was present during the discussion, where
strikingly different views were presented with courtesy even if with suitable intensity.
1. Cheshire Calhoun, Who’s Afraid of Polygamous Marriage? Lessons for Same-Sex
Marriage Advocacy from the History of Polygamy, 42 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1023 (2005).
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close biological relatives.”2 If we include the marriage of cousins within
the definition of incest, then I would be somewhat surprised if incestuous
marriages in American history have not been at least as frequent as the
number of polygamous marriages even during the heyday of the
unreformed Mormon Church,3 not to mention the present practices of
those “renegade” Mormons (at least from the perspective of the Church
of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints) who refuse to accept the 1890
reversal by the LDS of the duty to engage in polygamy.4 Similarly, there
is no particular reason to believe that marriages involving quite young
individuals are so rare as one might hope. Older readers might recall
rock star Jerry Lee Lewis’s marriage some years ago to a thirteen-year-old
cousin5—indeed, since he apparently had not yet divorced his current
wife, Lewis’s marriage presumably qualifies as incestuous, bigamous,
and underage all at once!—even as younger ones might have read about
Mary Kay Letourneau, who as a thirty-three-year-old teacher entered into
a sexual relationship with a twelve-year-old male student, whom she
married after serving a seven-year prison term for rape.6
In part, I think that Professor Calhoun’s list reveals the continuing
(and inevitable) power of unexamined background assumptions even as
the central thrust of her paper is to challenge certain of these assumptions.
Consider in this context the fact that we often refer casually to American
politics being based on “universal suffrage,” ignoring, for starters, the
tens of millions of children who are not entitled to vote. The reason that
this exclusion—unlike, say, the exclusion of felons from voting in many
states—is almost never thought to challenge the assertion of “universal
suffrage” is that “we”7 assume that the exclusion is perfectly sensible
and that, indeed, any argument to the contrary would be, to say the least,
questionable. (“Do you really mean to allow a five-year-old to vote?
That’s just crazy!”) It is not that the restriction of suffrage to adults, at
2. See Denise Grady, Few Risks Seen to the Children of 1st Cousins, N.Y. TIMES,
April 4, 2002, at A1.
3. As Ms. Grady writes:
It is not known how many cousins marry or live together. Estimates of
marriages between related people, which include first cousins and more distant
ones, range from less than 0.1 percent of the general population to 1.5 percent.
In the past, small studies have found much higher rates in some areas. A
survey in 1942 found 18.7 percent in a small town in Kentucky and a 1980
study found 33 percent in a Mennonite community in Kansas.
Id.
4. See Calhoun, supra note 1, at 1029.
5. See Rotten.com, Jerry Lee Lewis, http://www.rotten.com/library/bio/entertainers/music/
jerry-lee-lewis/ (last visited Aug. 19, 2005).
6. Letourneau Marries Former Student Fualaau: Notorious Pair Weds Following
Teacher’s Release from Prison, MSNBC, May 21, 2005, http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/7926717/.
7. The “scare quotes” are intentional because, inevitably, the existence of the
community that makes such judgments can itself become a major bone of contention.
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least legally defined, is not important; it is that we cannot take seriously
a critique of the exclusion of children. For most, the same would be true
regarding the restriction of suffrage to citizens and the concomitant
exclusion of long-term resident aliens. “Universal suffrage” is just
thought to mean the availability of the vote to adult law-abiding citizens.
Those who are in fact excluded are, in some sense, not viewed as part of
the relevant universe.
So Professor Calhoun is smuggling a highly normative, rather than
merely empirical, claim into her assertion of what counts as an “important”
bar to civil marriage. No one, one assumes, would wish to defend prior
bans on slave or interracial marriages.8 In some ways, her paper is
written to those who believe, as I do, that the prohibition of same-sex
marriages is no more defensible than those earlier bans, and she asks
whether the same legal tolerance should be added to polygamous marriage.
But, as noted, she does not ask similar questions about incestuous or
underage marriage. I assume the reason is that she herself would not credit
any argument made by, say, a brother and sister that respect for their
autonomy should entitle them to a marriage license. Or she may simply
be making a tactical judgment that it would be far too costly to her own
political aims to suggest analogies to incestuous marriage. Consider
what use social conservatives would make of a frank admission by a
proponent of same-sex marriage that the same arguments (especially if
based on a strong theory of autonomy) would indeed apply to incest.9 It
is easier, in every sense, to hope that no one will think of incest.

8. Though, as became clear in the discussions at the conference at which this
paper was initially presented, if one views marriage primarily through the lens of “what
is good for children” rather than a more libertarian “is there any legitimate reason to
prevent adults from acting autonomously in matters of love,” then the arguments against
same-sex marriage would seemingly apply to interracial marriage or, for that matter,
interreligious marriage, inasmuch as there would certainly be some plausible, albeit
disputed, evidence that children in what might be termed “heterogeneous” marriages
may have more social difficulties than children from “homogeneous” marriages.
9. Pennsylvania Senator Rick Santorum made just such a connection in a 2003
interview condemning the possibility (which, of course, turned out to be the reality) that
the Supreme Court’s would overturn Texas’s laws barring same-sex sodomy. “If the
Supreme Court says that you have the right to consensual (gay) sex within your home,
then you have the right to bigamy, you have the right to polygamy, you have the right to
incest, you have the right to adultery.” Sean Loughlin, Two Republicans Criticize Santorum
for Remarks About Gays, CNN, Apr. 24, 2003, http://www.cnn.com/2003/ALLPOLITICS/
04/24/santorum.gays.
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It is useful to recall, in this context, the twists and turns in Justice
Blackmun’s dissent in Bowers v. Hardwick,10 when he attempted to
differentiate the (putatively illegitimate) ban by Georgia on what the
majority insisted on calling “homosexual sodomy” and its bans of adult
incest and adultery.11 It is, after all, difficult to defend these two bans on
anything other than purely “moral” grounds. This is especially the case
with adult incest, which can be viewed as a “victimless crime,” unlike
incest involving children or adultery.
The standard “genetic” argument that is often trotted out with regard
to adult incest—children of incestuous parents are more likely to have
certain birth defects—is riddled with holes;12 indeed, I am tempted to
describe it simply as bogus. Begin with the fact that it is, in the modern
world, extraordinarily under-inclusive if the genuine concern is
protecting the gene pool or simply reducing the risk of children born
with certain defects. We now live in a world that, for better and worse,
allows genetic testing of all who wish to get married; if the state truly
cares about protecting the gene pool or prospective children, then it
could obviously refuse a marriage license to any couple whose genetic
match is, in the view of the state, suboptimal. I obviously put to one
side whether we would tolerate such a move toward state-mandated
eugenics. The central point is that one can scarcely limit one’s eugenic
impulses to the trifling number of incestuous unions as against the far
more likely number of “ill-matched” nonrelated couples. The “genetic”
argument is also, and just as obviously, over-inclusive with regard to
those siblings who might be sterile and thus unable to give birth. The
use of the “scientific” argument against incest is, therefore, simply a
subterfuge for the “moral” argument that one is ultimately making.
The same is true of adultery. Although adultery can be viewed as a
“crime” with a “victim,” it can also be viewed, as Justice Blackmun
himself suggested, as simply a breach of promise (or contract).13 And it
is a fundamental truth of our particular legal order that we almost never
“punish” people for breaching contracts, even if we allow the victims of
a breach to sue for damages. Again, the only plausible rationale for
criminalizing adultery is that one is morally offended by that particular
breach in a way that one is not morally offended by other breaches of
promise; indeed, one may be a fan of theories of “efficient breach” that
encourage promise-breaking in certain instances,14 which might even
10. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
11. Id. at 209 n.4 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
12. See Grady, supra note 2.
13. See Bowers, 478 U.S. at 209 n.4.
14. The theory of “efficient breach” of contract was apparently first articulated by
Robert Birmingham, Breach of Contract, Damage Measures, and Economic Efficiency,
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extend to countenancing adultery when the adulterer’s gains are greater
than the cuckolded spouse’s losses (and, by stipulation, the errant spouse
has compensated the victim, perhaps through a generous divorce
settlement). So the problem facing Justice Blackmun, which I dare say
he did not solve with flying colors, is to explain why society, acting
through the state, can exhibit its moralism with regard to incest and
adultery, but not to “homosexual sodomy.”15
Justice White had a different problem in his majority opinion:16 he had
to reassure heterosexuals, who survey data suggest are active and eager
participants in oral sex17 (which usually counts under state law as
“sodomy”18), that they were not at risk of punishment in Georgia (or
anywhere else). So he simply rewrote the Georgia statute, which did not
in fact differentiate between straights and gays, to apply only to
“homosexual sodomy,”19 with the negative pregnant, for the majority of
heterosexual Americans, that their own rights to engage in fellatio and
24 RUTGERS L. REV. 273, 284 (1970). See also Daniel Friedmann, The Efficient Breach
Fallacy, 18 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (1989).
15. See, e.g., Bowers, 478 U.S. at 190.
16. Id. at 188.
17. See Schochet v. State, 541 A.2d 183, 206 n.3 (Md. App. 1988):
In his first report, Sexual Behavior in the Human Male (1948), Alfred Kinsey
found that fewer than half of the men interviewed engaged in fellatio or
cunnilingus, even during marriage. In the category of highest incidence—married
men with 13+ years of education—45.3% performed cunnilingus and 42.7%
engaged in fellatio. Five years later, in his Sexual Behavior in the Human
Female, Kinsey reported that 54% of the married women interviewed had
engaged in pre-coital cunnilingus and 49% had engaged in fellatio. See also P.
Gebhard and A. Johnson, The Kinsey Data (1979). In their 1977 Redbook
Report on Female Sexuality, C. Tavris and S. Sadd found that 93% of wives
responding reported having engaged in cunnilingus and 91% had engaged in
fellatio. They concluded from this response that, “Today it is clear that if the
sexual revolution has occurred anywhere, it is in the practice and acceptance of
oral sex. Among people under age twenty-five, it is virtually a universal part of
the sexual relationship.”
P. Blumsteln and P. Schwartz have reported similar statistics—93% of
heterosexual couples had engaged in cunnilingus and 90% had engaged in
fellatio. See also W. Masters, V. Johnson, and R. Kolodny, Human Sexuality
393 (1985). Nor is this phenomenon confined to the young. E. Brecher reports
In Love, Sex, and Aging 358–59 (1984), that, among people over 50, 49% of
women and 56% of men engaged in cunnilingus and 43% of women and 49%
of men engaged in fellatio.
Id.
18. For a listing of sodomy laws, see Sodomy Laws, http://www.sodomylaws.
org/usa/usa.htm (last modified Apr. 30, 2005).
19. See Bowers, 478 U.S. at 190.
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cunnilingus (and probably even anal sex) were not at risk, even as the
state could prohibit similar behavior when engaged in by same-sex
couples. Thankfully, Lawrence 20 brought an end to this foolishness, though
Justice Kennedy scarcely did any better than Justice Blackmun in
offering a full explanation of the reach (and limits) of the libertarianism
that seemingly underlay the opinion.21
So what remains clear is that some degree of social moralism is
constitutionally acceptable even in a liberal constitutional order, though,
as a matter of fact, we have no particularly good way of offering a
satisfactory theoretical account of what is acceptable. The best that most
lawyers can do is to engage in a basically quasi-sociological, Holmesian,
reading of the law that predicts judicial activity on the basis of the
judges’ own likely views about given behaviors. This allows me to say
with some confidence that the Court will strike down a given instance of
social moralism when it becomes viewed by significant portions of the
society, including, especially, elites with whom judges tend to identify,
as “oppressive” rather than “constitutive” of a decent society. Thus, it
seems extremely probable that the Court will definitely not, in any
foreseeable future, look kindly on a brother and sister or adult parent and
adult child who wish to have sex with one another or, even more
certainly, get married to one another, despite the fact that many of us are
quite confident (even if some rue rather than applaud) that the Court
will, in the not too distant future—say ten to twenty years—find the ban
on same-sex marriage to be as objectionable, constitutionally, as the
earlier ban on interracial marriage. The task would be considerably
more difficult if lawyers were held to the same standards as philosophers
and had to present plausible systematic accounts of the lines we draw
with regard to what is acceptable or unacceptable.
In any event, it is the obvious political, even if not “philosophical,”
difference between same-sex and adult-incestuous marriage that, by
analogy, offers the best answer to Professor Calhoun’s perhaps artfully
naïve inquiry as to why proponents of same-sex marriage are not eager
to ask, at least in public, “And indeed, why not also polygamy?”22 If I
were advising gay- and lesbian-rights groups, I would heartily counsel
them to distance themselves from the socially marginal groups that today
advocate polygamy. There would be little to gain, and possibly much to
lose, by embracing the strange practices of decidedly off-putting people
from Utah and Arizona as part of the argument on behalf of better
treatment for gays and lesbians. But this is, obviously, entirely a
20.
21.
22.
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political point. It has nothing at all to do with the philosophical and
empirical arguments that take up the remainder of her paper.23
As it happens, I am in substantial agreement with Professor Calhoun
that polygamy may have at least enough to be said for it that it should
not be banned in contemporary American society, especially given the
legal and social toleration today of what some call the “serial polygamy”
that is the consequence of the easy availability of “no fault” divorce.24
To be sure, some of the participants at the San Diego conference clearly
indicated their unhappiness at this development in American society;
they would clearly love to turn the clock back to a time when divorce
was, at the very least, difficult, if not, indeed, impossible. But even they
recognized that there is simply no possibility, within contemporary
America, of any such literally “reactionary” development. For better
and, perhaps, worse, we are, as a society, irrevocably committed to
privileging individual autonomy over the presumptive social benefits of
preserving marriages.
The easiest defense of polygamy, of course, would be based on
individual autonomy. If consenting adults wish to live in such a
relationship, why ought not the state allow it? Or, to put it in standard
constitutional terms, why should it not be a violation of equal protection
of the law if Alice, Brad, and Carol are not allowed to purchase the same
marriage license that Alice and Brad or Brad and Carol would
presumably be allowed to purchase? (Obviously, there is also the
possibility that Alice and Carol would like to purchase a license.) What
particular interest does the state have in restricting the legal boon of
marital status to two persons instead of three (or more)?
One answer sounds in social morality, but, of course, it is just such an
answer that is ruled out by many forms of “liberal” theory, which require
that the state be neutral among different moral views, at least in the
absence of demonstrable harm to third parties.
Much of the discussion in San Diego, especially about same-sex
marriage, attempted to deflect attention from the unabashed “moral”
argument (that same-sex marriage flouts natural law) by offering a more
consequentialist form of argument that attempted to discern harms in the
practice. That is, several participants suggested that same-sex marriages
23. Id. at 1027–42.
24. Id. at 1031 (citing Nancy Rosenblum, Democratic Sex: Reynolds v. U.S.,
Sexual Relations, and Community, in SEX, PREFERENCE, AND FAMILY: ESSAYS ON LAW
AND NATURE 78 (David M. Estlund & Martha C. Nussbaum eds., 1997)).
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are bad for children, because there is something very important about
being raised by parents of two sexes.25 Not surprisingly, one response
was that the evidence is decidedly mixed on this point; it was suggested,
for example, that the very worst situation for a child is a household
consisting of the birth mother and a live-in boyfriend. Similar arguments
were heard, especially with regard to the question of whether a liberal
state had any business encouraging the institution of marriage at all,
about the presumptive costs to children of being raised by single parents,
whether male or female.
Consider, though, another argument made in defense of marriage as a
social institution to be encouraged by state policies. Several people
suggested, altogether plausibly, that a boon of marriage is precisely the
“til death do we part” promise (whether or not it actually describes
reality) that makes it more likely than it might otherwise be that our
(married) partners will take care of us when we are old and sick. And
concomitantly, that we will choose to take care of our ailing partners
even if we are in fine form because, after all, we promised to. As
someone sailing ever more rapidly into what is euphemistically called
one’s “sunset years,” I am not at all disrespectful of such arguments.
The hook, though, is that if one assesses marriage not as an idealistic
“meeting of two minds” or joinder of “soul mates” and the like, but
rather as an institution focused, in the early stages on rearing children,
and then later on taking care of ailing partners, then polygamy begins to
look better and better. Begin with the children: There is no reason at all
why a child who benefits from the presence of two parental caregivers
would not benefit even more from the presence of more adults (and
half-brothers and half-sisters) that would have their welfare at heart. Even
if one is a Darwinist (as were several people in San Diego) and therefore
committed to the view that “birth parents” are more likely to be interested in
the welfare of their children (that is, their genes) than are other nongenetic
contributors to the child, one might still believe that non-birth parents or
caregivers, if treated as part of the “family,” will be beneficial rather
than detrimental to child welfare (not to mention the often harried
parents forced to cope by themselves with the tasks of childrearing).
This is, after all, simply a form of the “extended family” argument.
One might argue, of course, that children of polygamous families
would suffer a certain social opprobrium, but this has nothing more to
commend it than the argument that children should be protected by the
25. Whether there are only “two sexes” is beyond the scope of this brief Comment.
Though consider the existence of hermaphrodites, transsexuals, and others who fit quite
uneasily within the standard, unexamined assumption that there are two-and-only-two
bins within which all of us can be sorted.
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state from participating in interracial families. The Supreme Court
unanimously rejected such an argument in Palmore v. Sidoti,26 where the
judge below had assigned custody of a teenage child to her father instead
of her mother solely because the white mother had entered into a
relationship with an African-American.27 This would, said the judge,
serve to protect the child from the inevitable social tensions attached to
being viewed by outsiders as a member of an interracial household.28
The opinion in Palmore is remarkably short 29—as is basically true with
respect to Loving v. Virginia,30 the case unanimously striking down
Virginia’s antimiscegenation law in 196731—conveying the notion that the
Supreme Court saw literally no merit in the argument that the state could
in effect honor the bigoted views of many of its citizens by incorporating
them into its determination of what is in the “best interests of the
child.”32 The best way of understanding Palmore is as a declaration that
when determining such interests judges must assume, albeit counterfactually,
that our society lives up to the demands of our liberal social order. If
that is correct with regard to the legitimacy of taking race into account
when deciding how children should be raised, then the same argument
would seemingly apply with regard to whether a child is in a monogamous
or polygamous (or, of course, same-sex) home.
It is with regard to caregiving at the end of life that the arguments for
polygamy seem strongest. After all, what we are talking about is a form
of social insurance. We are seeking not only financial contributions from
the income streams of our mates—those we could get by purchasing an
adequate insurance policy—but also a reasonable likelihood that we will
be taken care of in our dotage, when we are least likely to be particularly
attractive in the overall social marketplace, by someone who actually
cares about us and is thus indifferent to the availability of “better” mates
in the outside market. It may be true that one’s partner in a monogamous
marriage is marginally more likely to do that than a partner in a
polygamous marriage, though for obvious reasons there is nothing that
can count as real data on the point.
26. Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429 (1984).
27. Id. at 430–31.
28. Id. at 431.
29. The entire opinion is only five pages long. Id. at 430–34.
30. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967). The opinion here is eleven pages long.
Id. at 2–12.
31. Id. at 2, 13.
32. See Palmore, 466 U.S. at 433.
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But one is also taking a far greater risk by relying only on a single
partner. Retirement analysts emphasize the importance of diversifying
one’s portfolio. Sound “blue chips,” such as General Motors, AT&T,
TWA, Penn Central, and the like (let alone Enron), might have undetected
problems; one should put one’s retirement savings into a good index
fund. Similarly, if one is interested in being taken care of when one gets
ill, a participant in even the most loving monogamous marriage is
putting his or her eggs in one decidedly fragile basket. Even putting
aside personal “betrayals” of late-marriage divorces, there is always the
possibility of accidents and fatal illnesses that remove the anticipated
caregiver from the scene. Incidentally, this is certainly true of women,
who are, because of differences in life expectancies coupled with the fact
that it continues to be the case that most husbands are older than the
wives they marry, at far greater risk of being left alone than are their
husbands. This obviously suggests that polyandry may make more
social sense than polygyny, unless one assumes that the multiple wives
would indeed be willing to take care of one another even in the absence
of the now-dead husband. If legally recognized polygamy were available,
one might easily foresee a relatively large number of “communal
marriages” entered into by middle-aged or old-aged persons. Though
one should not ignore (or disdain) the likelihood of a sexual element in
such marriages, the far more likely explanation would indeed be to make
sure that one is less likely to be left alone as one gets older. And, incidentally,
one might expect the children of monogamous marriages to be especially
approving of such communal marriages if the alternative is that the sick,
now alone, parent will show up at their doorstep demanding that the
children now provide the care the parent needs.
Professor Calhoun provides a real service by opening up our minds with
regard to our conceptualization of marriage-as-a-state-controlled-institution
and her suggestion that we ought to be far more pluralistic than we are
now with regard to what should count as a legally recognized marriage.
I personally find her arguments unanswerable, unless one makes a strong
argument that there is a transcendent morality regarding the institution of
marriage that a liberal state can, and should, recognize. But, of course,
this is just to reopen the oldest question about political liberalism, which
is the relationship between the public order and conflicting views of how
best to lead one’s “private” life.
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